By Vivian Kalla
I do not feel as though it is a controversial point on campus to say that I am opposed to the recent opinions of the Supreme Court. I believe it is important to accurately recognize, understand and watch for the results that may come of the recent decisions — such as those in Trump v. United States (2024) and Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo (2024) — which challenge the foundations of a functional republican government. It is also essential to recognize the fundamental threat such decisions pose to the very legitimacy of the court as a judicial body and the implications with regards to separated powers. In effect, if the court’s decisions no longer have any basis in law, it may become an open question why people should listen to what they say.
For those not up to date with current jurisprudence, a quick summary of these cases and their significance is in order. Trump v. United States was the case decided last summer regarding the question of presidential immunity for crimes committed in office. In an opinion uncharacteristically devoid of functional legal reasoning, Chief Justice John Roberts held that the separation of powers doctrine “entitles a former president to absolute immunity from criminal prosecution for actions within his conclusive and preclusive constitutional authority.” To translate the legalese, this effectively means that under no circumstances may any current or former president be prosecuted for any actions that the Constitution specifically grants them the power to take.
As an example of how such a decision might be leveraged, it could reasonably be interpreted to grant the president the ability to order the assassination of political opponents, civilians or anyone else and be totally immune from prosecution so long as they are to do it in the correct manner. There are a hundred more examples of how such power could be used for grift, retaliation, political violence or the unconstitutional maintenance of power beyond a four-year term.
I have further bad news for those who believe competent federal agencies might provide a shield from the worst of the effects. In yet another uncharacteristic opinion, Roberts utterly eschews the doctrine of stare decisis by overturning the decades-old Chevron doctrine. Stare decisis (Latin for “a matter decided”) refers to a doctrine in legal reasoning to defer to earlier rulings on the same issues, which is absolutely essential to the entire concept of precedent. In effectively ignoring this doctrine, the court sets a dangerous new precedent that any decision can be overturned. When combined with the court’s current ideological disposition, this places cases such as Griswold v. Connecticut (1965), which protected the right to contraception, on the chopping block.
Moving to the functional impact of this decision, we have what was overturned — the so-called Chevron doctrine. This doctrine, established by Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., stated that in matters of ambiguous law passed by Congress, courts are sometimes required to defer to “permissible interpretations” of those laws made by the federal agencies set to administer them. For example, if Congress passes a law that has to do with improving water quality but leaves the details vague, the courts should defer to the Environmental Protection Agency to interpret the specifics, given that their interpretation is reasonable. This system was constructed to ensure that federal agencies staffed by qualified scientists and experts would be able to leverage that expertise to achieve the goals set out by Congress in their legislation.
The reversal of this decision places judges in charge of determining which interpretation of the scientific evidence to accept. In the above example, if a company were dumping chemicals into a river, and the EPA sued to stop them, under Chevron, the EPA’s scientists would be given deference by the court so long as their interpretation of the facts was reasonable. Under the new system, it is up to a judge to decide whether to listen to the scientists from the EPA, or the scientists from the company accused of polluting. While some may celebrate this as a beneficial step towards judicial autonomy, it places judges — who cannot possibly be expected to become a PhD-level expert in all the subject matters they rule on — in a position where they must decide which scientists to listen to.
Beyond that, more cynical observers may point out that it throws the doors wide open for corruption and grift among those less scrupulous on the Federal bench.
These decisions, especially that of Trump v. United States, are incredibly significant departures from traditional principles of legal reasoning. In almost any court ruling one may point to, there is at least some effort plausibly describable as good faith to adhere to some principles of Federalism, the text of the constitution, historical precedent, common law or statutory law. Not so here. Roberts pays little attention to any of these factors, almost entirely ignoring the text of the constitution and all fundamental principles of republican government that necessitate separation of powers and a system of checks and balances.
For a justice held up as a pillar of moderation and reason on today’s increasingly politicized court, Roberts unconscionably departs from that which he purports to champion: tradition and precedent.
It is ironic, then, that he attempts to base his reasoning in the Trump decision on such principles. Citing the need for an “energetic” executive from Hamilton’s Federalist 70, Roberts violates any and all fundamental principles of Federalism, as Justice Sonia Sotomayor describes in her dissent, by making the president “a king above the law.”
The court is no stranger to difficult, controversial and government-shaping decisions. Many are familiar with cases such as Brown v. Board of Education (1954) which mandated the desegregation of southern schools and Roe v. Wade (1973) which helped protect abortion rights.
We see that in cases with such fundamental importance to their respective areas of society and law the court has not previously shied away from making difficult and controversial decisions. In order to do so, the court has relied on compelling legal reasoning to shield its legitimacy with such society-shaping decisions. Even if one disagrees with them, there is a compelling, well-reasoned and legally-defensible logic by which the Court reaches their decision. With the recent Trump and Loper Bright decisions, this is not the case.
In issuing an opinion of such monumental importance without a hint of constitutional, statutory or even common law basis, the court has taken an existential risk. Those who disagree with the outcome are not provided with an argument to refute. Instead, they are left with a fundamental question — if the court can issue a legal opinion with no basis in the law, why should we care what they say?
I do not intend to argue that the court is illegitimate. To do so would, in my opinion, do a disservice to all the legally sound and reasonable opinions that the court does issue. Fortunately, Trump and Loper Bright are still the exceptions rather than the rule. However, these recent opinions place the court on a dark path. Should they choose not to rectify these mistakes — or even worse, should they continue to make them — they risk the fundamental balance of our system of separated powers, and the rights and lives of the American people.
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